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# **National Intelligence Daily**

Friday 30 October 1981

**Top Secret** 

CO NID 81-253JX

30 October 1981

Copy 229



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POLAND: IMF Green Light	
Poland reportedly has decided in principle to apply for IMF membership, a move that could give some comfort to Poland's Western creditors.	25 <b>X</b> 1
The USSR, according to the Poles, recently withdrew its longstanding opposition to membership for Poland.	25X1 25X1
Assuming that Warsaw applies soon, membership will not be possible until mid- to late-1982. Poland thus will not be able to obtain immediate financial help from the IMF in meeting its \$9-10 billion financial requirement in the next year. The IMF link, however, should help Warsaw in its drive to reschedule its debts and to obtain new credits.	25X1
The IMF will make credits contingent on Warsaw's implementation of tough stabilization policies. Although Solidarity leader Walesa has already endorsed IMF membership, the union is likely to object to the kinds of tough austerity measures that the IMF will seek. Moscow will be sensitive to any appearance of Western control over	25X1
the Polish economy.	25X1
Meanwhile, the Soviets apparently have agreed to send Poland an additional 30,000 tons of meat by the end of the year. The extra meat imports, announced at the Central Committee session on Wednesday by party leader Jaruzelski, are worth \$40 million at Western prices and will help Warsaw meet some, but not all, of its rationing obligations.	25X1
During this month, Warsaw imported 25,000 tons of meat but still failedby 13,000 tonsto provide enough meat in the state distribution system to cover its commitments. The Soviet move seems intended as a show of support for Jaruzelski at relatively little cost.	
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	SOUTH AFRICA - ANGOLA: Impending Incurs	sion	25 <b>X</b> 1
	South African forces apparently are preparmajor incursion into Angola.	ring for another	25X1
	The operation almost certainly would bases of the South-West Africa People's It apparently would involve a few thousa	Organization.	J
	force than used in the incursion in Augu At that time, South African attempts to	st and September.	25X1
	forces reportedly were unsuccessful; the may be an effort to complete the job bef	new operation	20/(1

A decision to launch such an operation during the Western Contact Group's current trip to Africa would underscore South Africa's determination to place military objectives above other considerations. Pretoria probably calculates that the Western allies and the Frontline States are locked into the settlement process and will not pull out. Even if the negotiations were to break down, the South Africans probably believe that the West would not act against them.

hinder conventional military operations.

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CHAD: Political Maneuvering		
N'Djamena is outwardly calm despite continu behind-the-scenes maneuvering by rival factions o government.		25 <b>X</b> 1
President Goukouni, who apparently i by southern non-Muslim leader Vice Presid retains nominal control of the government reported on Thursday that the cabinet has the immediate withdrawal of Libyan troops and their departure from the rest of Chad	ent Kamougue, . Radio Chad called for from N'Djamena	
the year.	1	25X1
The broadcast said that an inter-Afr an integrated Chadian Army would take ove by the Libyans. The cabinet meeting coin departure for Tripoli of visiting Libyan Jallud.	r areas vacated cided with the	25X1

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JAMAICA-CUBA: Break in Relations	
Prime Minister Seaga's decision to break diplomatic with Cuba stems from his growing concern that Havana is hand training Jamaican subversives.	e relations parboring 25X1
Police have uncovered tapes and letters from leader of the youth branch of the opposition parawhich implicate radical leftists with terrorists gunmen who fled to Cuba after Seaga's election.	rty, s <u>and</u>
	25X1
Seaga has ordered the Cuban Charge to depart tomorrow. Havana's 34-member diplomatic staff a 60 other personnel engaged in medical, constructed educational programs probably will also have to	and about tion, and
Havana television reacted with the comment Seaga has joined "the maneuvers orchestrated by imperialism" against Cuba.	
In addition, the expulsion may stiffen the of Jamaican radicals who are anxious to undercurgovernment's faltering economic recovery program	t the_
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
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EL SALVADOR: Reaction to Mediation Proposal	
Short-term prospects for a dialogue between the junta and the insurgents have received a serious setback.	25 <b>X</b> 1
A recent Mexican initiative elicited a positive response from the cogoverning Christian Democrats, who recognize that some leftist participation in constituent assembly elections scheduled for March would help legitimize the government. Although junta Vice President Colonel Gutierrez apparently shares the view, most senior military leaders have long opposed talks with the guerrillas.	25X1 25X1
The Christian Democrats' subsequent release of a statement disavowing their willingness to negotiate with the insurgents has calmed the situation. The episode will complicate further mediation initiatives, however, and is likely to strengthen the left's already successful	
propaganda effort.	25X1

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## ROMANIA: Arms Reduction Proposal

President Ceausescu's recent proposal for a withdrawal of Soviet missiles in return for cancellation of US deployment of medium-range missiles in Western Europe may have been made to enhance his prestige at home and abroad at the risk of angering Moscow. This is the first time a Warsaw Pact leader has publicly advocated a reduction of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Ceausescu's remarks are in contrast to standard Warsaw Pact assertions that NATO's LRTNF decision of 1979 will upset the existing theater nuclear balance. His implication that there is an imbalance in Moscow's favor may prompt a private reprimand from Moscow. The President's other statements, which included praise of West European peace demonstrations, appear designed to blunt potential Soviet objections.

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Ceausescu's independent action may have been intended, in part, to counter recent speculation in the Western press that Romania's current economic problems may force Bucharest to turn eastward and modify its foreign policy. He also may have hoped to enhance his image as an independent statesman in order to strengthen domestic support in the face of deteriorating living standards and associated popular discontent.

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KAMPUCHEA: Diversion of Humanitarian Aid		
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as much as 95	percent of the	
rice provided by relief organizations is		~
by Vietnamese and Kampuchean officials.	25	^
Sy victuamese and nampaement officials.		
	25>	<b>&lt;</b> 1
77:0	tnamese officials 25X	,,
	207	CT.
last year retained 30 to 50 percent of for		
received from international organizations	•	
	25)	<b>X</b> 1
The current high level of diversions	is the result	
of the bleak outlook for the current rice	crop, a poor	
logistics system, and recent cutbacks in	Western and Soviet	
aid to both Kampuchea and Vietnam. Some	of the diverted	
supplies are consumed by the Vietnamese a		
official community, while other goods are		
black market.		
DIGON MALINEO.	25X1	

#### IRAN: New Prime Minister

Mir Hussein Musavi, who was approved as Prime Minister by the Iranian Assembly yesterday, was nominated for the office by President Khamenei--the chairman of the Islamic Republic Party--after the Assembly rejected the first nominee. The relative closeness of the vote on Musavi suggests that the new party leadership is having difficulty controlling factions within the party. There are indications that Musavi, who has been Foreign Minister, is related to the President but that the regime has tried to conceal his family tie.

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